Erratum: Humans perceive warmth and competence in artificial intelligence.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.107256.].

Humans perceive warmth and competence in artificial intelligence.

Artificial intelligence (A.I.) increasingly suffuses everyday life. However, people are frequently reluctant to interact with A.I. systems. This challenges both the deployment of beneficial A.I. technology and the development of deep learning systems that depend on humans for oversight, direction, and regulation. Nine studies (N = 3,300) demonstrate that social-cognitive processes guide human interactions across a diverse range of real-world A.I. systems. Across studies, perceived warmth and competence emerge prominently in participants' impressions of A.I. systems. Judgments of warmth and competence systematically depend on human-A.I. interdependence and autonomy. In particular, participants perceive systems that optimize interests aligned with human interests as warmer and systems that operate independently from human direction as more competent. Finally, a prisoner's dilemma game shows that warmth and competence judgments predict participants' willingness to cooperate with a deep-learning system. These results underscore the generality of intent detection to perceptions of a broad array of algorithmic actors.

A spontaneous stereotype content model: Taxonomy, properties, and prediction.

The spontaneous stereotype content model (SSCM) describes a comprehensive taxonomy, with associated properties and predictive value, of social-group beliefs that perceivers report in open-ended responses. Four studies (N = 1,470) show the utility of spontaneous stereotypes, compared to traditional, prompted, scale-based stereotypes. Using natural language processing text analyses, Study 1 shows the most common spontaneous stereotype dimensions for salient social groups. Our results confirm existing stereotype models' dimensions, while uncovering a significant prevalence of dimensions that these models do not cover, such as Health, Appearance, and Deviance. The SSCM also characterizes the valence, direction, and accessibility of reported dimensions (e.g., Ability stereotypes are mostly positive, but Morality stereotypes are mostly negative; Sociability stereotypes are provided later than Ability stereotypes in a sequence of open-ended responses). Studies 2 and 3 check the robustness of these findings by: using a larger sample of social groups, varying time pressure, and diversifying analytical strategies. Study 3 also establishes the value of spontaneous stereotypes: compared to scales alone, open-ended measures improve predictions of attitudes toward social groups. Improvement in attitude prediction results partially from a more comprehensive taxonomy as well as a construct we refer to as stereotype representativeness: the prevalence of a stereotype dimension in perceivers' spontaneous beliefs about a social group. Finally, Study 4 examines how the taxonomy provides additional insight into stereotypes' influence on decision-making in socially relevant scenarios. Overall, spontaneous content broadens our understanding of stereotyping and intergroup relations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Globally Inaccurate Stereotypes Can Result From Locally Adaptive Exploration.

Inaccurate stereotypes-perceived differences among groups that do not actually differ-are prevalent and consequential. Past research explains stereotypes as emerging from a range of factors, including motivational biases, cognitive limitations, and information deficits. Considering the minimal forces required to produce inaccurate assumptions about group differences, we found that locally adaptive exploration is sufficient: An initial arbitrary interaction, if rewarding enough, may discourage people from investigating alternatives that would be equal or better. Historical accidents can snowball into globally inaccurate generalizations, and inaccurate stereotypes can emerge in the absence of real group differences. Using multiarmed-bandit models, we found that the mere act of choosing among groups with the goal of maximizing the long-term benefit of interactions is enough to produce inaccurate assessments of different groups. This phenomenon was reproduced in two large online experiments with English-speaking adults (N = 2,404), which demonstrated a minimal process that suffices to produce biased impressions.

Cosmopolitan morality trades off in-group for the world, separating benefits and protection.

Global cooperation rests on popular endorsement of cosmopolitan values-putting all humanity equal to or ahead of conationals. Despite being comparative judgments that may trade off, even sacrifice, the in-group's interests for the rest of the world, moral cosmopolitanism finds support in large, nationally representative surveys from Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Japan, the United States, Colombia, and Guatemala. A series of studies probe this trading off of the in-group's interests against the world's interests. Respondents everywhere distinguish preventing harm to foreign citizens, which almost all support, from redistributing resources, which only about half support. These two dimensions of moral cosmopolitanism, equitable security (preventing harm) and equitable benefits (redistributing resources), predict attitudes toward contested international policies, actual charitable donations, and preferences for mask and vaccine allocations in the COVID-19 response. The dimensions do not reflect several demographic variables and only weakly reflect political ideology. Moral cosmopolitanism also differs from related psychological constructs such as group identity. Finally, to understand the underlying thought structures, natural language processing reveals cognitive associations underlying moral cosmopolitanism (e.g., world, both) versus the alternative, parochial moral mindset (e.g., USA, first). Making these global or local terms accessible introduces an effective intervention that at least temporarily leads more people to behave like moral cosmopolitans.

As diversity increases, people paradoxically perceive social groups as more similar.

With globalization and immigration, societal contexts differ in sheer variety of resident social groups. Social diversity challenges individuals to think in new ways about new kinds of people and where their groups all stand, relative to each other. However, psychological science does not yet specify how human minds represent social diversity, in homogeneous or heterogenous contexts. Mental maps of the array of society's groups should differ when individuals inhabit more and less diverse ecologies. Nonetheless, predictions disagree on how they should differ. Confirmation bias suggests more diversity means more stereotype dispersion: With increased exposure, perceivers' mental maps might differentiate more among groups, so their stereotypes would spread out (disperse). In contrast, individuation suggests more diversity means less stereotype dispersion, as perceivers experience within-group variety and between-group overlap. Worldwide, nationwide, individual, and longitudinal datasets (n = 12,011) revealed a diversity paradox: More diversity consistently meant less stereotype dispersion. Both contextual and perceived ethnic diversity correlate with decreased stereotype dispersion. Countries and US states with higher levels of ethnic diversity (e.g., South Africa and Hawaii, versus South Korea and Vermont), online individuals who perceive more ethnic diversity, and students who moved to more ethnically diverse colleges mentally represent ethnic groups as more similar to each other, on warmth and competence stereotypes. Homogeneity shows more-differentiated stereotypes; ironically, those with the least exposure have the most-distinct stereotypes. Diversity means less-differentiated stereotypes, as in the melting pot metaphor. Diversity and reduced dispersion also correlate positively with subjective wellbeing.

Stereotypes as Historical Accidents: Images of Social Class in Postcommunist Versus Capitalist Societies.

Stereotypes are ideological and justify the existing social structure. Although stereotypes persist, they can change when the context changes. Communism's rise in Eastern Europe and Asia in the 20th century provides a natural experiment examining social-structural effects on social class stereotypes. Nine samples from postcommunist countries (N = 2,241), compared with 38 capitalist countries (N = 4,344), support the historical, sociocultural rootedness of stereotypes. More positive stereotypes of the working class appear in postcommunist countries, both compared with other social groups in the country and compared with working-class stereotypes in capitalist countries; postcommunist countries also show more negative stereotypes of the upper class. We further explore whether communism's ideological legacy reflects how societies infer groups' stereotypic competence and warmth from structural status and competition. Postcommunist societies show weaker status-competence relations and stronger (negative) competition-warmth relations; respectively, the lower meritocratic beliefs and higher priority of embeddedness as ideological legacies may shape these relationships.

Vertical and horizontal inequality are status and power differences: applications to stereotyping by competence and warmth.

Status (respect, prestige) and power (resource control) arguably form two kinds of inequality. Status differences appear culturally reasonable as vertical inequality-with a common rationale: meritocracy (deservingness). High-status individuals and groups are accorded competence. Status differences divide people by inequality, but so do differences in power (sharing resource control). Power-sharing (or not) can be cooperative, peer interdependence, tending toward equality, or competitive rivalry, negative interdependence, tending toward inequality. This kind of (in)equality-power-sharing (or not)-theoretically differs from vertical status differences. Orientation to power-sharing thus is horizontal (in)equality. One end creates competitive friction among the distrusted and dissimilar. At the other end, horizontal equality creates mutual cooperation of the warm, similar, and familiar. Distinguishing status and power differences broadens inequality's scope.

Exploring Research-Methods Blogs in Psychology: Who Posts What About Whom, and With What Effect?

During the methods crisis in psychology and other sciences, much discussion developed online in forums such as blogs and other social media. Hence, this increasingly popular channel of scientific discussion itself needs to be explored to inform current controversies, record the historical moment, improve methods communication, and address equity issues. Who posts what about whom, and with what effect? Does a particular generation or gender contribute more than another? Do blogs focus narrowly on methods, or do they cover a range of issues? How do they discuss individual researchers, and how do readers respond? What are some impacts? Web-scraping and text-analysis techniques provide a snapshot characterizing 41 current research-methods blogs in psychology. Bloggers mostly represented psychology's traditional leaderships' demographic categories: primarily male, mid- to late career, associated with American institutions, White, and with established citation counts. As methods blogs, their posts mainly concern statistics, replication (particularly statistical power), and research findings. The few posts that mentioned individual researchers substantially focused on replication issues; they received more views, social-media impact, comments, and citations. Male individual researchers were mentioned much more often than female researchers. Further data can inform perspectives about these new channels of scientific communication, with the shared aim of improving scientific practices.